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<channel>
	<title>The Italian Honey Project</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.honeynet.it/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.honeynet.it</link>
	<description>The Italian chapter of the Honeynet Research Alliance</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 11 Jan 2012 11:44:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en</language>
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		<title>SpyEye begins to use post transaction attack</title>
		<link>http://www.honeynet.it/malware/spyeye-begins-to-use-post-transaction-attack</link>
		<comments>http://www.honeynet.it/malware/spyeye-begins-to-use-post-transaction-attack#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Jan 2012 11:44:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>marco.riccardi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Malware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking Trojan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fraud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Info Stealer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SpyEye]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.honeynet.it/?p=448</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
“Post transaction attacks, as the name implies, occur after the evil deed has already been done and the account holder has closed the online banking session. These are designed to conceal illegitimate activity for as long as possible to either allow money to transfer to its final destination – uninterrupted, or continue to control the [...]
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>“Post transaction attacks, as the name implies, occur after the evil deed has already been done and the account holder has closed the online banking session. These are designed to conceal illegitimate activity for as long as possible to either allow money to transfer to its final destination – uninterrupted, or continue to control the account and perform further transactions.” said Amit Klein Trusteer’s CTO.</p></blockquote>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<blockquote><p><strong>Malware post-transaction attack in detail</strong></p>
<p>Step 1: Malware post-login attack &#8211; credentials stolen</p>
<p>a. Fraudsters infect the victim’s machine with Man in the Browser malware (any MitB malware, e.g. Zeus, SpyEye, Carberp), with a suitable configuration.</p>
<p>b. The malware is configured to ask the customer for debit card data during the login phase (HTML injection) – e.g. card number, CVV2, expiration month and year, etc.</p>
<p>Step 2: Fraudster commits fraudulent activity</p>
<p>c. With the customer’s debit card details, the cybercriminals then commit card-not-present transaction fraud by making a purchase or transferring money over the telephone or the internet.</p>
<p>d. The fraudsters immediately feed the fraudulent transaction details to the malware control panel.</p>
<p>Step 3: Malware post-transaction attack with fraud hidden from view</p>
<p>e. The next time the victim visits their online banking site, the malware hides (“replaces”) the fraudulent transactions in the “view transactions” page, as well as artificially changing the total fraudulent transaction amount to balance the totals. As a result, the deceived customer has no idea that their account has been ‘taken over’, nor that any fraudulent transactions have taken place</p></blockquote>
<p>via <a href="http://www.net-security.org/malware_news.php?id=1951&amp;utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+HelpNetSecurity+%28Help+Net+Security%29&amp;utm_content=Google+Reader">SpyEye Trojan post transaction fraud schemes attack banks</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>New Zeus variant ‘Gameover’ armed for DDoS attacks</title>
		<link>http://www.honeynet.it/malware/new-zeus-variant-%e2%80%98gameover%e2%80%99-armed-for-ddos-attacks</link>
		<comments>http://www.honeynet.it/malware/new-zeus-variant-%e2%80%98gameover%e2%80%99-armed-for-ddos-attacks#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Jan 2012 09:22:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>marco.riccardi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Malware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking Trojan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DDoS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gameover]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[zeus]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.honeynet.it/?p=446</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
The malware is appropriately called “Gameover” because once it’s on your computer, it can steal usernames and passwords and defeat common methods of user authentication employed by financial institutions. And once the crooks get into your bank account, it’s definitely “game over.”Gameover is a newer variant of the Zeus malware, which was created several years [...]
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>The malware is appropriately called “Gameover” because once it’s on your computer, it can steal usernames and passwords and defeat common methods of user authentication employed by financial institutions. And once the crooks get into your bank account, it’s definitely “game over.”Gameover is a newer variant of the Zeus malware, which was created several years ago and specifically targeted banking information.</p></blockquote>
<p>via <a href="http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2012/january/malware_010612/malware_010612">FBI — ‘Gameover’ Malware Targets Bank Accounts</a>.</p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>ZeuS P2P variant analysis</title>
		<link>http://www.honeynet.it/malware/zeus-p2p-variant-analysis</link>
		<comments>http://www.honeynet.it/malware/zeus-p2p-variant-analysis#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Jan 2012 14:02:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>marco.riccardi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Malware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking Trojan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[P2P]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[zeus]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.honeynet.it/?p=444</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
[..]In the new version of the Trojan, the authors focus on eliminating the weakest link – a centralized system of information distribution. Previous versions of Zeus were based on one (or few) predefined addresses which were used for botnet management. This allowed for relatively easy tracking and blocking of servers, thus rendering the botnet useless. [...]
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>[..]In the new version of the Trojan, the authors focus on eliminating the weakest link – a centralized system of information distribution.<br />
Previous versions of Zeus were based on one (or few) predefined addresses which were used for botnet management. This allowed for relatively easy tracking and blocking of servers, thus rendering the botnet useless. However, the analysed variant of the Trojan used two new channels of communication to receive orders (figure on right):</p>
<ol>
<li>Communication in a peer-to-peer network</li>
<li>Domain names Generation Mechanism</li>
</ol>
<p>This variant has been analyzed to some extent by other researchers before – there is information on the web on the new variant of Zeus (eg <a href="http://www.abuse.ch/?p=3499"> abuse.ch </a>), however – based on our knowledge – previous research has focused on registering and monitoring traffic to Zeus domains. <strong>In our work we focus on understanding the P2P network communication mechanisms, mapping out the network, and monitoring the exchange of information in this particular network.</strong> [..]<strong><br />
</strong></p></blockquote>
<p>via <a href="http://www.cert.pl/news/4711/langswitch_lang/en">CERT Polska » Blog Archive » ZeuS – P2P+DGA variant – mapping out and understanding the threat</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Zeus V2.1.0.10 adds Random Domain Generator</title>
		<link>http://www.honeynet.it/botnet/zeus-v2-1-0-10-adds-random-domain-generator</link>
		<comments>http://www.honeynet.it/botnet/zeus-v2-1-0-10-adds-random-domain-generator#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Nov 2011 12:34:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>marco.riccardi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Malware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking Trojan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[zeus]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.honeynet.it/?p=441</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
This special variant further uses another obfuscation technique for cases where it fails to find a live update point. In order to make sure the botnet always ‘calls home’ Zeus 2.1.0.10’s operators programmed a randomized, on-the-fly domain name generator, based on a constant algorithm the Trojan’s configuration dictates. The algorithm creates 1,020 domain names URLs [...]
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>This special variant further uses another obfuscation technique for cases where it fails to find a live update point. In order to make sure the botnet always ‘calls home’ Zeus 2.1.0.10’s operators programmed a randomized, on-the-fly domain name generator, based on a constant algorithm the Trojan’s configuration dictates. The algorithm creates 1,020 domain names URLs per day. Each new and unique domain name is a string of letters. The suffix “/news” or “/forum” follows the domain name when it is used for the Trojan’s update and drop communications.</p></blockquote>
<p>via <a href="http://blogs.rsa.com/rsafarl/organized-cybercrime-nefarious-sophistication-featuring-zeus-v2-1-0-10/">Organized Cybercrime: Nefarious Sophistication Featuring Zeus V2.1.0.10 « Speaking of Security – The RSA Blog and Podcast</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>SpyEye goes beyond 2 factor auth</title>
		<link>http://www.honeynet.it/botnet/spyeye-goes-beyond-2-factor-auth</link>
		<comments>http://www.honeynet.it/botnet/spyeye-goes-beyond-2-factor-auth#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2011 09:46:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>marco.riccardi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking Trojan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SpyEye]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.honeynet.it/?p=439</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
This month, the criminals behind the reincarnation of Zeus, known as SpyEye, found another way to circumvent the security measures introduced by some online banks. Researchers at financial security firm Trusteer documented a variant of SpyEye that has the ability to infect a computer, steal the victim&#8217;s logon credentials, and change the phone number that [...]
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>This month, the criminals behind the reincarnation of Zeus, known as SpyEye, found another way to circumvent the security measures introduced by some online banks. Researchers at financial security firm Trusteer documented a variant of SpyEye that has the ability to infect a computer, steal the victim&#8217;s logon credentials, and change the phone number that the bank uses to confirm transactions. It&#8217;s the latest update to an attack that, among other tactics, infected the mobile phone to which banks would send text messages to confirm transactions.</p>
<p>&#8220;This attack is much stronger than what we had seen before,&#8221; says Mickey Boodaei, CEO of Trusteer. attack is</p></blockquote>
<p>via <a href="http://www.darkreading.com/advanced-threats/167901091/security/client-security/231901086/banking-trojans-adapting-to-cheat-out-of-band-security.html">Banking Trojans Adapting To Cheat Out-of-Band Security &#8211; Dark Reading</a>.</p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Congratulation to Domenico Chiarito!</title>
		<link>http://www.honeynet.it/project-news/congratulation-to-domenico-chiarito</link>
		<comments>http://www.honeynet.it/project-news/congratulation-to-domenico-chiarito#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 20 Oct 2011 14:34:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>marco.riccardi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Project News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Dorothy Project]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Italian Honeynet Project]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fellows]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[JDrone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thesis]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.honeynet.it/?p=436</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
Folks, I&#8217;d like to say &#8220;Congrats!&#8221; to Domenico Chiarito who has just completed his Bachelor studies in &#8220;System and Network Security&#8221; @ the University of Milan (DTI). Domenico made his Thesis on the JDrone project. He drastically improved our botnet monitoring software by integrating a relational database  with the existing JDrone components (Client, and Server). His [...]
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Folks,</p>
<p>I&#8217;d like to say &#8220;Congrats!&#8221; to Domenico Chiarito who has just completed his Bachelor studies in &#8220;System and Network Security&#8221; @ the University of Milan (DTI).</p>
<p>Domenico made his Thesis on the JDrone project. He drastically improved our botnet monitoring software by integrating a relational database  with the existing JDrone components (Client, and Server).</p>
<p>His work could be downloaded <a title="JDrone 2.0" href="Thesis Chiarito Jdrone2 Nd">here</a>.</p>
<p>Thank you Domenico, the Honeynet.it project was pleased to mentor you during your work, and we really hope that you will continue to help us on such project.</p>
<p>m4rco-</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>P2P Version of Zeus Botnet Appears &#124; threatpost</title>
		<link>http://www.honeynet.it/botnet/p2p-version-of-zeus-botnet-appears-threatpost</link>
		<comments>http://www.honeynet.it/botnet/p2p-version-of-zeus-botnet-appears-threatpost#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 20 Oct 2011 11:51:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>marco.riccardi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking Trojan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[P2P]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[zeus]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.honeynet.it/?p=433</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
A new version of the Zeus malware has appeared, and this does not seem to be a minor upgrade, but a major custom version of the Trojan, which now sports a P2P capability that does away with the use of the domain-generation algorithm used in earlier versions and instead uses a hardcoded list of IP [...]
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>A new version of the Zeus malware has appeared, and this does not seem to be a minor upgrade, but a major custom version of the Trojan, which now sports a P2P capability that does away with the use of the domain-generation algorithm used in earlier versions and instead uses a hardcoded list of IP addresses to provide infected PCs with new software and config files. This is a throwback to the way the malware used to behave, but it comes with a twist: There no longer is a master URL that infected machines contact to get updates, making it much more difficult to track the Trojan&#8217;s activities.</p>
<p>[..]</p>
<p>The version of Zeus discovered recently by the Swiss Abuse.ch group implements this strategy through the inclusion of a built-in list of IP addresses that each newly infected PC should try to contact in order to receive instructions and updated configuration files. The new bot does this by sending out UDP packets on a high-numbered port, looking for like-mided peers. If one responds, the new bot will get a new list of IPs of other infected PCs in the botnet. The version of Zeus also can remotely check which version of the malware is running on remote PCs and download an updated version, if necessary, the researchers said in a blog post analyzing the Zeus update.</p>
<p>[..]</p>
<p>&#8220;At first glance these are bad news. But fortunately the new mechanism also has benefits: There is just one ZeuS C&amp;C active at the same time, so every time the domain name gets suspended/terminated, the criminals have to push out a new config file.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>via <a href="http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/p2p-version-zeus-botnet-appears-101111">P2P Version of Zeus Botnet Appears | threatpost</a>.</p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Are SpyEye and Zeus still married ?</title>
		<link>http://www.honeynet.it/botnet/are-spyeye-and-zeus-still-married</link>
		<comments>http://www.honeynet.it/botnet/are-spyeye-and-zeus-still-married#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Oct 2011 09:03:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>marco.riccardi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Malware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking Trojan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SpyEye]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[zeus]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.honeynet.it/?p=431</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
[..] Dmitry Tarakanov, a researcher at Kaspersky Lab who has studied the two families said that there was a code transfer from Zeus to SpyEye in the immediate aftermath of the source code being transferred to the SpyEye author. For example, the SpyEye author grabbed a Zeus feature that allowed the malware to force Web [...]
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>[..] Dmitry Tarakanov, a researcher at Kaspersky Lab who has studied the two families said that there was a code transfer from Zeus to SpyEye in the immediate aftermath of the source code being transferred to the SpyEye author. For example, the SpyEye author grabbed a Zeus feature that allowed the malware to force Web browsers on infected systems to load malicious HTML served by the botnet, even in cases where the host had a recent version of the page in question (say, an electronic banking site) stored locally in its browser cache. &#8220;SpyEye could not intercept the cached html-code,&#8221; Tarakanov wrote in an e-mail. &#8220;So the author of Spyeye had seen that part of the code where Zeus replaces the cache as well and added that part of code into his own source code of SpyEye. [..] &#8220;</p></blockquote>
<p>via <a href="http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/spyeye-and-zeus-malware-married-or-living-separately-101411">SpyEye and Zeus Malware: Married Or Living Separately? | threatpost</a>.</p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>New ZeuS 2 Variant spoted</title>
		<link>http://www.honeynet.it/botnet/new-zeus-2-variant-spoted</link>
		<comments>http://www.honeynet.it/botnet/new-zeus-2-variant-spoted#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Oct 2011 08:37:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>marco.riccardi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Malware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking Trojan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[zeus]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.honeynet.it/?p=429</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
[..] This new version, which Trend Micro detects as TSPY_ZBOT.SMQH, spread around late September through spam that claimed to be from the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The spammed messages contained a malicious link that when clicked directed users to a malicious website that served the BlackHole Exploit Kit. The exploit kit, in turn, downloads a [...]
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>[..]</p>
<p>This new version, which Trend Micro detects as <a href="http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/Malware.aspx?language=us&amp;name=TSPY_ZBOT.SMQH" target="_blank">TSPY_ZBOT.SMQH</a>,  spread around late September through spam that claimed to be from the  Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The spammed messages contained a  malicious link that when clicked directed users to a malicious website  that served the <em><a href="http://blog.trendmicro.com/a-refresher-on-spam-and-exploits" target="_blank">BlackHole Exploit Kit</a>.</em> The exploit kit, in turn, downloads a variant of the new ZeuS version.</p>
<p>[..]</p>
<p>As we can see, unlike ZeuS 2.3.2.0, which uses Advanced Encryption  Standard (AES), <strong>the decryption algorithm did not change much compared  with the modified ZeuS 2, which uses RC4.</strong></p>
<p>As I mentioned earlier, like  LICAT and ZeuS 2.3.2.0, this new variant also seems to be crafted by a  private professional gang, probably the same ones who created LICAT or  who may be affiliated with them at the very least. In fact, the  configuration file for TSPY_ZBOT.SMQH has the same format as that of the  configuration file of LICAT.</p></blockquote>
<p>via <a href="http://blog.trendmicro.com/another-modified-zeus-variant-seen-in-the-wild/?awid=7917255160271489866-1985">Another Modified ZeuS 2 Variant Seen in the Wild</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>New financial malware in the wild: Shylock</title>
		<link>http://www.honeynet.it/botnet/new-financial-malware-on-the-wild-shylock</link>
		<comments>http://www.honeynet.it/botnet/new-financial-malware-on-the-wild-shylock#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Oct 2011 10:11:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>marco.riccardi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Malware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking Trojan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Botnet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shylock]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.honeynet.it/?p=426</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
On September 7, 2011, Trusteer announced they are investigating new financial malware they called Shylock that &#8220;uses unique mechanisms not found in other financial malware toolkits, including: an improved method for injecting code into additional browser processes to take control of the victim’s computer; a better evasion technique to prevent malware scanners from detecting its [...]
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>On September 7, 2011,  Trusteer announced they are investigating new financial malware they called Shylock that &#8220;uses unique mechanisms not found in other financial malware toolkits, including: an improved method for injecting code into additional browser processes to take control of the victim’s computer; a better evasion technique to prevent malware scanners from detecting its presence; a sophisticated watchdog service that allows it to resist removal attempts and restore operations&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>via <a href="http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2011/09/sept-21-greedy-shylock-financial.html#more">contagio: Sept 21 Greedy Shylock &#8211; financial malware</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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